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Evaluating Web-based Savings Interventions:  
A Preliminary Assessment 
Abstract 
There is reason to believe that technological approaches can help promote voluntary saving in 
401(k) retirement accounts. Working with Vanguard, a leading 401(k) plan administrator, we are 
evaluating the impact of introducing innovations to websites made available to retirement plan 
participants. The first innovation is a “Boost Your Saving” dial added to several plan homepages 
immediately after participants log on. The second innovation is a red/yellow/green “Traffic 
Signal” that can help people evaluate how well they are prepared for retirement. Our goal is to 
examine contribution and portfolio allocation patterns in the cross-section and also compare 
pre/post outcomes. The present report provides a preliminary evaluation of the impact on 401(k) 
plan saving decisions of the web-based savings dial, designed to increase the salience of 
retirement saving.  In what follows, we outline the innovation and some preliminary results. We 
show that including the savings dial on participants’ webpages did boost plan contribution rates. 
Nevertheless the effect appears to have dissipated after several months, perhaps due to the 
skewed distribution of participant web logons or to exogenous tax law changes occurring during 
our evaluation period. We are continuing to evaluate the experiment over time to measure its 
long-term effects. 
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Evaluating Web-based Savings Interventions:  
A Preliminary Assessment   
Introduction 
Retirement plan sponsors in various countries including the U.S. have adoption auto-
enrollment or “opt-out” saving regimes.1 In such arrangements, employees are automatically 
enrolled into workplace-based retirement plans, and plan contribution rates may also be 
periodically increased. While such efforts have been shown to boost retirement saving rates, only 
a minority of US workers have been automatically enrolled in retirement plans to date, and 
automatic contribution escalation programs are relatively uncommon. A recent survey of US 
employers indicated that only 56% offered automatic enrollment, and only 26% offered 
automatic escalation, with most such features applying prospectively only to new employees 
(World at Work, 2013). For this reason, many American workers must still make active saving 
choices when it comes to retirement saving in their defined contribution pension plans.  
Moreover, absent automatic enrollment into a default investment, most workers continue to make 
their own portfolio choices, raising concerns about the quality of portfolio diversification among 
a less sophisticated investor population.   
The goal of this project is to explore the efficacy of technological approaches to promote 
voluntary saving and improve portfolio allocations in 401(k) accounts.  In a world where 
financial decisions are increasingly mediated by technology, whether through the internet or 
through mobile devices, an emerging question for researchers is how user the design of such 
mechanisms can influence consequential household financial choices.   
1 New Zealand and Australia mandate pension coverage for virtually all employees age 18-65 (Paterson 
2013). In the UK, a recent law required all employers to automatically enroll workers into workplace 
pensions if they are between the ages of 22 and the national retirement age; earn over £9,440 per year; 
and work in the UK (Gov.uk, 2013). 
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Background 
The conventional economics literature on household saving patterns conjectures that 
rational individuals optimally allocate their time and money over their life cycles, saving when 
young to support old age consumption. Early research by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and 
Friedman (1957) posited that consumers arranged their optimal saving and decumulation patterns 
to smooth marginal utility over their lifetimes. This optimization process would be shaped by 
consumer preferences (e.g., risk aversion and discount rates), the economic environment (e.g., 
investment returns and liquidity constraints), and social safety net benefits (e.g., the availability 
and generosity of welfare schemes and Social Security and Medicare benefits).2 Such models 
also generally held that households had the ability to undertake complex economic calculations 
and implement their plans without difficulty.  
More recent research has suggested that such theoretically optimal behavior turns out to 
be difficult to implement in practice. Around the world, many people lack financial knowledge to 
design and formulate such plans (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011). Moreover, they tend to have 
difficulty turning good intentions into reality. For instance, Bernheim (1994, 1998) reported that 
people often admit to not saving enough, even given incentives to do so. In another study, 
Beshears et al. (2011) demonstrated that households preferred a savings account with withdrawal 
restrictions over a fully liquid account, indicating a desire for commitment devices in response to 
concerns about self-control. In another example, Casari (2009) asked participants in a delayed 
reward experiment whether they would like to restrict their future choices and found that many 
would give up money to do so.  
2Recent surveys of the literature on savings appear in Skinner (2007) and Attanasio and Weber 
(2010); newer advances are offered by Cagetti (2003); Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell 
(2012); DeNardi, French, and Jones (2011); French (2005, 2008); Gourinchas and Parker (2002); 
Hurst and Aguiar (2005, 2007); and Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006).  
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These and related studies in behavioral economics have suggested that assistance or 
guidance may be required to help households do a better job of saving for retirement (see 
Mitchell and Utkus, 2004, for a summary). There is clear evidence that auto-enrollment enhances 
plan participation and boosts retirement contribution patterns (c.f., Madrian and Shea, 2001; 
Choi et. al., 2003; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004) and that default investment arrangements influence 
participant portfolio holdings (Mitchell and Utkus, 2012). As a result, over the last decade, some 
plan sponsors and policymakers have turned to the so-called “choice architecture” approach for 
retirement savings (Thaler and Sunstein, 2010), where retirement plan sponsors automatically 
enroll workers into the plans, provide pre-set investment defaults, and sometimes offer auto-
escalation of contribution rates over time.    Other work has focused on the importance of active 
decisions (Carroll et. al., 2009) in promoting saving.  A more recent development has been the 
use of commitment devices to enhance saving behavior, such as the use of mobile phones to 
communicate savings “nudges” and exploit peer group effects (Kast, Meier and Pomeranz, 
2012).  
To date, however, relatively little analysis has been done on how to better inform active 
employees of the need to save more for retirement. Saving shortfalls are at least in part traceable 
to poor financial literacy skills (Behrman et al., 2012). That is, around the world people lack a 
clear understanding of compound interest, risk diversification, and inflation, and these deficits 
apply to young and older workers alike (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). But even when people are 
better informed and know they need to save more for retirement, they still find it difficult to 
implement these plans (Hastings and Mitchell, 2011; Hastings, Mitchell, and Chyn, 2011). 
Accordingly, there has been a growing policy interest in experimental interventions making it 
easier for retirement plan participants to save more when they decide to do so.  
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The “Boost Your Saving” Dial 
At the outset of this project, we proposed to design, implement, and evaluate web-based 
technologies that could help active members of an employment-based 401(k) plan save more for 
retirement. In particular, a leading plan administrator has designed and implemented a Boost 
Your Saving dial in the context of 401(k) retirement plan websites, seeking to evaluate whether 
this might encourage existing plan participants visiting the site to boost their plan contribution 
rates immediately. The rationale for this new dial was that participants already had the option of 
boosting their deferral rates online, but the process could be complicated in practice. 
Accordingly, the saving dial was designed to test whether increasing the salience and ease of 
increasing individuals’ plan deferral rates can alter retirement plan contribution behavior.3  This 
effort is distinct from savings mechanisms that propose to increase a participant’s plan 
contribution rate in the future, such as the Save More Tomorrow program. 
On December 6, 2012, the Boost Your Saving dial as depicted in Figure 1 was launched.  
This dial appeared prominently on the “account balance” page seen by existing plan participants 
when first logging on their 401(k) account.  Prior to this, participants had the option of altering 
their plan contribution rates on the website.  Nevertheless, the process involved more steps and 
was not easily accessible from the home page. Once the dial was introduced, participants could 
3 In related work, we are also exploring a second innovation, namely the introduction of a 
red/yellow/green “Traffic Signal” that helps participants estimate how well they are prepared for 
retirement. Provided by the online investment advice provider Financial Engines, the Traffic 
Signal offers a visual or graphical representation of how well each individual is managing along 
the road to saving adequacy. Financial Engines develops workers’ individualized assessments by 
running personalized retirement adequacy simulations based on data from certain plans that have 
authorized the service. Participants may take action in a number of ways, including changing 
savings rates and portfolio allocations, either on their own or as part of advice programs offered 
by Financial Engines. Accordingly, this intervention will test whether the graphical presentation 
of a complex financial metric such as retirement adequacy is effective in changing retirement 
plan behaviors. As yet the data are not in a form to analyze easily so additional reports will detail 
these findings as they are made available. 
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use it to alter plan contribution rates and, with one click, confirm the change.  (Alternatively, 
they could still alter plan contributions the old way if desired). 
Figure 1 here 
The dial provides information in a graphical format, rather than offering either textual or 
numeric data regarding the benefits of increased saving.  As such, it was designed to test whether 
representing the transaction to change savings as a simple graphic icon makes a difference. 
Moreover, the placement of the dial enhanced the salience of plan contributions, inasmuch as it 
appeared directly adjacent to the participants’ account balance data as soon as they logged on.  
The Dial also recommended a specific savings increase, either 1%, 2% or 3%, as explained 
below.    
Methods and Data 
The Boost Your Saving dial was first adopted by a set of plan sponsors introducing it to 
their websites beginning December 6, 2012. It was offered to participants in 1,100 defined 
contribution retirement plans covering a total potential sample population of 1.5 million 
participants.  The 1.5 million sample includes participants satisfying a series of conditions.  First, 
participants had to be registered to access their accounts via the internet.  Second, the dial was 
offered only to participants currently contributing 1-19% of pay, inclusive, to their retirement 
plans.  In other words, it excluded workers eligible but not participating in the plan, as well as 
those contributing 20% or more of pay.  Third, the intervention was offered only to participants 
contributing from one type (or “source”) of money – namely, either pre-tax contributions or Roth 
contributions, but not both. Fourth, to see the dial, participants had to log on to their accounts 
during our evaluation period, November 30, 2012 - May 31, 2013. And fifth, when participants 
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did make a change, either increasing or decreasing plan contributions, the dial was removed from 
their account pages for any subsequent logons.   
The dial was labeled with the phrase “Boost Your Savings.” It showed participants their 
current plan contribution rates and recommended that they boost their contributions by one, two 
or three percentage points from that base. Participants seeing the dial were randomly assigned to 
a recommended contribution size increment, based on which minute of an hour they had logged 
onto the account. For example, someone logging on five minutes after the hour received one of 
the percentage change offers, someone logging in six minutes after the hour received another, 
and so on. 
Because the Boost Your Saving dial was implemented by the recordkeeper, we were 
unable to randomly assign plan participants to treatment and control groups during the evaluation 
period.  Instead, we adopt a pre/post treatment comparison as a second-best empirical strategy. 
That is, we compare changes in plan savings behavior when the dial was offered, with those for a 
prior period when it was not offered. One candidate for the control period was the six months 
prior to the launch of the experiment. Another candidate control period was the same six months 
a year previous, namely November 30, 2011-May 31, 2012.  We chose the latter over the former 
due to the seasonality of plan contribution changes observed in the recordkeeping data. In effect, 
our control group represents participants who would have seen the savings dial had it been 
available a year earlier. 
Empirical Approach 
To date we have gathered two types of data.  The first we refer to as the “aggregate” 
dataset. It covers daily logon and contribution rate changes over both the treatment period (for 
6 
 
participants eligible to see the dial), and the control period (for participants who would have seen 
the dial had it been shown a year prior). This dataset aggregates all changes made to plan 
contribution rates via the web. Thus, during the treatment period, it includes individuals making 
changes with the Boost Your Saving dial as well as those using the traditional transaction 
mechanism available on the website.   
The second dataset, referred to here as the “savings dial” dataset, indicates who actually 
used the dial (drawn from a live website feed), as well as whether the participant logging on saw 
the one, two or three percentage point increase version. For this second dataset, we also have 
information on daily changes in plan contribution rates.4  
Because the datasets were received at the end of August 2013, and the datasets required 
some time to clean, this report provides preliminary summary statistics on our results to date. 
Our future research will combine these data with other information on participants including age, 
sex, income, job tenure, and 401(k) plan account characteristics. The goal will be to further 
refine our analysis and empirical modeling.  We anticipate updating the findings in the near 
future. 
Preliminary Results 
To date we have produced summary statistics on savings rate changes over time using the 
aggregate dataset, comparing patterns to participants seeing the dial to those from a year earlier 
when the dial was not available. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the control and 
treatment periods. During the control period, participants seeking to change plan contributions 
4 Because of a technical problem in data-gathering, actual savings dial usage data was missing 
for 23 days of the November 30, 2012- May 31, 2013 evaluation period.  We omit that period 
from the analysis below. 
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had to use the traditional transaction approach. During the treatment period, they could have 
changed contributions using the Boost Your Saving dial or followed the traditional transaction. 
Results show that some 4-5 million participants logged on monthly during both periods. In the 
prior period, some 0.42% of those who logged on boosted their saving rates; during the treatment 
period, this rose slightly to 0.49%, a relative increase of 17% before controlling for other 
differences between the control and treatment groups. The average percentage increase in saving 
rates was 4.32% during the control period, and 4.28% during the treatment period, a relative 
decline of only 1%, again before controlling for other influences. In the both periods, only about 
0.2% of those who logged on reduced their contribution rates, and the average percentage 
decrease among these few individuals was a negative 4.1-4.2 percent. 
Table 1 here 
Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of these patterns (data begin in October rather 
than November as in Table 1). Panel A focuses on increases in contribution rates while Panel B 
illustrates the difference between the treatment and year-earlier control periods. Interestingly, the 
pattern of saving increases started after the introduction of the Boost Your Saving dial, and the 
treatment effect was largest during this initial phase. The boost in saving rates continued for 
several months, and then it dissipated. We attribute this pattern partly to the fact that web usage 
among plan participants is highly skewed, with a small fraction of participants logging on 
frequently (see Figure 3). After this initial exposure, it appears that the effect of the savings dial 
declined.  
Figures 2 and 3 here 
We can also detect some slight differences in contributions rate decreases. Table 1 and 
Figure 4 compare year over year plan contribution rate declines and the summary difference in 
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treatment versus control groups. Results suggest that immediately after the Boost Your Saving 
dial was introduced, some participants actually decreased their contribution rates, especially in 
January 2013; on average, however, the fraction of decreasers did not change from the same 
period in the year before.    
Figure 4 here 
Besides the Savings Dial, there is another alternative explanation for the change we 
observe in behavior, namely tax changes that occurred in January of 2013. In that month, 
marginal tax rates rose on upper-income households, and the 2% Social Security payroll tax 
suspension ended for all workers.  One plausible explanation for the increase in tax-deferred 
contributions was an effort by high-income households to increase tax-deductible contributions 
in a higher-rate environment.  Similarly, the notable spike among participants reducing their 
contributions in January 2013 may be a result of certain households reacting to the impact of 
higher Social Security taxes on take-home pay (or the effect of other benefits changes such as 
higher health care premiums in the new calendar year).  At the same time, the rate of decreasing 
savings did not change over longer periods between control and treatment group, suggesting 
these are only small timing differences.    
Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the savings dial effect will persist as new 
participants register on and view the website. Since new hires are relatively fewer in number 
compared to the existing participants, evaluating a new hire impact will require a longer 
evaluation period. Future work will seek to disentangle the effects of these various factors by 
drawing data from later periods. 
Table 2 provides summary characteristics of the savings dial sample. In total, almost half 
a million participants saw the savings dial when they logged into their accounts.  Of these, 9% 
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actually used the dial to increase their savings. On average, participants using the Boost Your 
Saving dial increased their savings 2.1 percentage points, from 7% to 9.1%. Almost all 
participants used the dial to increase their saving rate, rather than to decrease it.   
Table 2 here 
Using the “saving dial” sample, Figure 5 summarizes results on the impact of the default 
savings increase displayed by the dial.  Panel A demonstrates that participants were marginally 
more likely to use the dial when they were shown a 1% increase, but slightly less likely to use 
the dial when they were shown a 3% increase. Thus 31% of treated participants saw a 
recommended three percentage point increase, but they accounted for only 27% of participants 
actually increasing their plan contribution rate. Panel B indicates that among participants 
increasing their contribution rates, just under two-thirds of participants, or 63%, used the 
recommended increase. Of the remaining 37% who opted to select their own deferral rate 
change, those randomly shown the 1% option boosted their savings on average 1.28%; those 
shown the 2% option increased their saving rate an average of 0.73%; and those shown the 3% 
option ended up making no essentially no change (-0.07%).  
Figure 5 here 
Discussion  
When the Boost Your Saving dial was introduced to plan participants, there was a 
noticeable jump in those increasing plan contribution rates, especially in the first few months of 
the experiment.  The rate of those decreasing contributions did not change over our six-month 
treatment period, though there was a noticeable increase in savings reductions in January 2013 
that remains to be understood.   
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Several considerations are worth noting. One is that we have determined that a large 
fraction of participants who boosted their saving rates online, some 40%, never saw the dial even 
though they were eligible.  Perhaps because they were impatient, they clicked past the dial before 
it had time to load on their webpages. Accordingly, we conjecture that the fraction of participants 
which actually used the dial to change contribution rates is higher.   
Another point to note is that the effect of the dial appears to have dissipated after several 
months. One possible explanation for the dissipating effect is the skewed distribution of 
participant logon behavior, where the same users tend to long on frequently. Once someone had 
changed his saving rate, he would no longer see the dial. Consequently the fraction of those 
logging on and seeing the dial declined with time.  As well, regular users of the website, having 
seen the dial once or twice, but having decided not to make a change, might tend to overlook it 
with repeated exposure. 
Another possible explanation is the sizeable tax law changes that occurred in the early 
part of January 2013. These changes may have motivated participants to take action to adjust 
their saving rates in response to these tax changes, either increasing or decreasing plan 
contributions, and it may explain why further adjustments dampened after the first several 
months. Additional analysis of the data over time may help disentangle these effects. 
It is also important to recognize that our experiment targeted those who were already 
contributing to an employer retirement program, and who were web-registered to access their 
accounts online. Moreover, we track only those who accessed and saw the savings dial during 
the evaluation period. In other words, our findings in the dial experiment do not speak to the 
experiences of non-savers or those lacking internet access. 
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Conclusions and Future Work 
Consistent with expectations, contribution rates rose for those seeing the Boost Your 
Saving dial compared to the control period. Also compared to a year earlier, the fraction of 
participants increasing plan contributions upon logon rose by a relative 17%, although from a 
low base (just under less that ½ of 1% of those logging on daily).  Some 9% used the Boost Your 
Saving dial, increasing their contribution rates by an average of 2 percentage points. There was 
no change in the fraction of participants decreasing their contributions. 
These findings are relevant to efforts to evaluate programmatic interventions to improve 
financial literacy and savings, particularly those that address the increasing role of technology-
based household financial decisions. Employees and their families are increasingly using 
electronic media to obtain financial information and conduct financial transactions. 
Understanding how interventions in the electronic world can alter household saving behavior 
will continue to deserve research and policy attention. Future work will incorporate additional 
statistical controls so as to more cleanly extract the impact of the web-based innovation.  We also 
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Table 1.  Aggregate Sample Characteristics  
A. Control Period (November 30, 2011 - May 31, 2012) 
 
N Logons N Increasers % Incr N Decreasers % Decr Av. increase % Av. decrease % 
Dec 2011 4,107,699 14,835 0.36% 8,240 0.20% 5.60% -4.37% 
Jan 2012 5,003,790 23,172 0.46% 9,978 0.20% 4.01% -4.11% 
Feb 2012 4,568,926 20,250 0.44% 9,496 0.21% 4.19% -4.41% 
Mar 2012 4,467,611 20,737 0.46% 8,038 0.18% 3.95% -4.03% 
Apr 2012 4,234,064 19,416 0.46% 7,738 0.18% 3.98% -4.03% 
May 2012 3,980,776 13,014 0.33% 7,955 0.20% 4.17% -4.15% 
Average over 
period 
  0.42%   0.20% 4.32% -4.18% 
B. Treatment Period (November 30, 2012 - May 31, 2013) 
 
N Logons N Increasers % Incr N Decreasers % Decr Av. increase % Av. decrease % 
Dec 2012 4,386,859 23150 0.53% 7483 0.17% 7.15% -4.34% 
Jan 2013 5,721,086 34103 0.60% 14214 0.25% 3.71% -3.68% 
Feb 2013 4,443,031 21696 0.49% 10246 0.23% 3.87% -4.30% 
Mar 2013 5,554,553 27431 0.49% 10574 0.19% 3.62% -4.00% 
Apr 2013 5,356,976 25876 0.48% 9581 0.18% 3.66% -4.05% 
May 2013 5,518,997 19618 0.36% 9022 0.16% 3.64% -4.20% 
Average over 
period 
  0.49%  0.20% 4.28% -4.10% 
Source: Authors’ tabulations.  
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Table 2.  Savings Dial Sample Characteristics. Treatment period (November 30, 2012 - May 31, 2013) 















Dec 2012 187,216 6,201 3% 99.8% 
Jan 2013 152,030 8,946 6% 99.8% 
Feb 2013 32983* 6,674 * 99.9% 
Mar 2013 10897* 7,353 * 100.0% 
Apr 2013 88,220 7,121 8% 99.9% 
May 2013 52,755 5,285 10% 100.0% 
 480,221 41,580 9%  
* 'Saw the Dial' data missing for 19 days in February 2013 and 4 days in March 2013. 
B. Summary of Participant Changes 
Average contribution 




Source: Authors’ tabulations   
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Figure 2.  Daily Saving Rate Increases  
A.  Year-over-year comparison: Percentage of plan contribution rate increases (October-May)  
B. Difference in saving rates: Treatment versus Control groups  




Figure 3.  Distribution of Unique Logons. Number of unique participant logons: December 6, 2012-
May 31, 2013. 







Figure 4.  Daily Saving Rate Decreases 
A.  Year-over-year comparison: Percentage of plan contribution rate decreases (October-May) 
B.  Difference in treatment versus control groups  
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
 
Figure 5.  Impact of Savings Dial Default Settings  
A.  Distribution of default increases displayed to participants who saw the dial compared to those that 
used the dial 
 
B.  Summary of anchor usage and voluntary increases  
 
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
23 
